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1 Introduction
During theUruguay Round the scope ofmultilateral
negotiations under the auspices of theWorld Trade
Organization (WTO) was extended to include trade
in services.The outcome was theGeneralAgreement
onTrade in Services (GATS), which was established
on 1 January 1995. Since 2000, negotiations on
the liberalisation of services have been ongoing
under the auspices of this agreement. Also known
as GATS 2000, these negotiations were initiated in
order to strengthen the GATS framework and
enhance world trade in services. The result is that
WTOmember countries are currently negotiating
the liberalisation of a wide range of services from
education to tourism to rubbish collection and
environmental services, which hitherto largely fell
under the jurisdiction of state control.
Since the conclusion of theGATS and the launch
ofGATS 2000, the agreement has come under severe
attack by a high-profile worldwide campaign
mobilised by organisations such as the World
Development Movement and Focus on the Global
South in both the North and the South. These
organisations and many others have accused the
WTO of displaying a severe democratic deficit in
the way its agenda has been hijacked by corporate
interests, thus having a detrimental impact on the
lives and livelihoods of the poor in developing
countries.GATS 2000 is seen to be a “frontal attack
on the fundamental social rights” enshrined in several
UN declarations and accompanying charters and
covenants, in particular due to its potential to
promote the commodification of life-giving resources
such as water and apply market-basedmechanisms
on sensitive sectors such as health and education.
The critics have also raised concerns regarding
developing country governments’ ability to utilise
policy mechanisms that can regulate services in such
a way as to achieve universal delivery ofbasic services
and safeguard the interests of poor people.
This article investigates the controversies and
processes surrounding efforts to liberalise domestic
water-related services under the auspices of the
WTO/GATS, with a particular emphasis on the
implications for poor people’s right to water. It
demonstrates that while liberalising water-related
services under the GATS may not necessarily
undermine, de jure, the ability of member-states to
introduce the kind of legislative measures that are
necessary to safeguard the interests of the poor,
there are a number of reasons to think that, de facto,
the exercise of policy autonomy might be
substantially curtailed. These constraints on the
capacity ofmember-states to protect the poor stem
from (a) inherent ambiguities in treaty
interpretation; (b) and the politics of process arising
out of power asymmetries and a lack of transparency
in processes of negotiation and policy review.These
and other factors can potentially lead to conflicting
aims and contradictory outcomes around issues of
trade, water provision, equity and rights.
The analysis of the GATS and water provision
highlights the increasing role of theWTO in defining
domestic policy agendas in developing countries
in areas that have a direct impact on the poor. The
effectiveness with which developing countries can
define and negotiate in support of their interests
when confronted with the agendas of developed
countries and their global service providers will
have a substantial impact on the livelihoods of the
poorest people in developing countries.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that
the analysis presented here is inherently speculative
due to the ongoing nature of the negotiations and
due to the fact that domestic water service delivery
is not officially one of the sectors covered by the
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GATS.No country has so far liberalised its domestic
water services under the auspices of the GATS.
However, 41 countries have recently offered
commitments on wastewater treatment and it is
now widely acknowledged that the European
Commission (EC) is interested in including water
service delivery in the definition of environmental
services under GATS, which would clearly serve
the interests of European water companies. Thus,
the debate around water privatisation, the GATS
and poor people’s access to water is clearly already
a controversial one that warrants discursive,
conceptual and empirical analysis. The analysis is
conducted both conceptually and empirically on
the basis of desk-based research of the growing
literature on WTO/GATS negotiations, NGO
statements and the general literature on water
privatisation experiences and it is complemented
by semi-structured interviews with negotiators,
campaigners, journalists and bureaucrats
The debates around theGATS and its impact on
poor people’s access to basic services such as water,
are closely related to debates around the nature of
water. The article therefore begins by examining
the case for the human right to water and the
implications that a rights-based view of water has
for the provision of water services. It then goes on
to explore existing water privatisation experiences
and their impact on poor people’s access to water.
After looking at the controversies around theGATS
in more detail, the article then draws on the
discussion of existing non-GATS privatisation
experiences and their impact on poor people’s access
to water to investigate whether GATS provisions
could undermine a government’s freedom to
regulate in a manner consistent with equity and
social considerations. The article concludes by
arguing that such safeguard provisions would exist
in an ideal world.However, in practice the politics
of process, ambiguity and power at themultilateral
and bilateral levels leave many doubts regarding
poor people’s rights to basic services under GATS.
2 Is there a fundamental right to
water?
Water is uniquely and fundamentally essential for
all aspects of life, well-being and productivity. It is
also the lifeblood of ecosystems, essential for many
eco-hydrological functions. For poor people, access
to clean and affordable water is a prerequisite to
achieving a minimum standard of health and to
undertake productive activities. However, it is
estimated that 1.1 billion people lack access to safe
water and almost 2.5 billion people – 40 per cent
of the world’s population – lack access to adequate
sanitation (Neto and Tropp 2000: 227).
A growing number of analysts have argued
eloquently that access to safe and adequate water
is not just a basic need, but a fundamental human
right, based on the criteria established in
international declarations that protect the right to
livelihood and well-being.While the right to water
was not explicitly endorsed in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), in 2002
a comment by the United Nations Committee on
Social and Economic Rights explicitly recognised
the right to water as a human right and stressed its
importance in realising other human rights (United
Nations Economic and Social Council 2002a). It
also stressed the role of states in progressively
realising the right to water, which is determined to
entail the provision of sufficient, safe, affordable
water to everyone.There are compelling arguments
for viewing access to water as a fundamental right.
Significantly improving water and sanitation can
reduce the spread of disease and improve people’s
health and well-being. It can enhance poor
households’ sense of dignity and independence and
free up the one to four hours a day poor women
and children spend collecting water. Still, current
orthodoxies in the water domain tend to focus on
the need to view water as an economic good and
there is a marked lack of official endorsement of
the human right to water.1 Since the Dublin
Statement of 1992,2 water has increasingly been
seen as having economic value in all its competing
uses. Because water is scarce, goes the logic, it must
be used judiciously and its demand managed.
Accordingly, efficient resource management is
equated with water having a price.
Access to basic services can either be gained
through private contractual arrangements or as
entitlements by virtue of citizenship. If ‘access to
public services is understood as aprivate contractual
right, it is determined by the terms and conditions
of the contract between service supplier and
consumer’ (Krajewski 2002). The defining
characteristic of such a contract is the consumer’s
ability topay for the service providedby the supplier.
In other words, if the right to water is perceived as
a contractual rather than a human right, water
services are subject to the laws of demand and supply,
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which invariably,due to thenature ofmarkets, would
be unable to guarantee equality and affordability of
access. By contrast when viewed from the human
right lens water is a public entitlement, access to
which does not depend on one’s ability to pay.
Nevertheless, viewing the water/tradenexus through
a human rights lens does not necessarily mean that
water services need to be free of charge or state run.
Instead, such a lens implies that states, which involve
private actors in the provision of basic services, are
legally obliged to establish effective and flexible
regulatory mechanisms that can secure the
progressive realisation of the right to water for all
people. In the current international context, where
an increasing number of developing countries are
privatising their basic social services, setting up
strong mechanisms to regulate private services in
order to achieve universal access is of major
importance.The key question is, however, whether
the regulatory space needed for governments to
secure its citizens universal, equal and affordable
access to public services is compromised by the
principles of the GATS as the activists argue. To
answer these questions we need to review non-GATS
privatisation experiences as well as the nature and
processes around the GATS.
3 Water privatisation and poor
people’s rights to water
The water sector, along with other utilities, has
certain specific characteristics, which have clear
implications for the way water is managed. First,
very few elements of the water sector are naturally
competitive, in other words it is characterised by
a high level of natural monopoly (Rees 1998).Thus
interventions, say in the formof a price ceiling, are
required in order to protect consumers from
monopoly power abuses (Barr 1998). Second, the
water sector is characterised by high capital intensity
and the presence of sunk costs, which implies that
the investments undertaken in the infrastructure
needed to provide a service are neither transferrable
or redeployed for other purposes (Rees 1998; Ugaz
2001b). This invariably increases the risk attached
to investment in the sector.
Taken together, the above characteristics have
often been used to argue for the public provision
of water services. In most parts of Europe, public
provision has traditionally been considered to be
the best way of guaranteeing the principle of
universalism, based on its ability to pool risk and
make use of cross subsidies to provide low-income
households, or those who live in high provision
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Table 1: Forms of private sector participation in the water sector
Contract type
Private sector Service Management Lease BOT/BOOa Concession Divestiture
involvement contract contract contract
Asset ownership Public Public Public Public and Public Private or public
private and private
Capital investment Public Public Public Private Private Private
Commercial risk Public Public Shared Private Private Private
Operations and Public and Private Private Private Private Private
maintenance private
Tariff collection Public Public/private Private Public Private Private
Duration 1–2 years 3–5 years 8–15 years 20–30 years 25–30 years Indefinite (may 
be limited by 
license)
Source: Bakker (2002).
cost areas, with affordable services (Finger and
Allouche 2002).
Despitemaintaining public control, developing
countries have often failed to universalise access to
water services.This is due to various reasons, which
include inadequate financial resources to undertake
the investments needed for adequate provision of
these services (World Bank 1994; Ugaz 2001a),
mismanagement andpoor institutional arrangements.
Consequently, privatisation has been promoted as
the appropriate remedy.Often this has taken place
through World Bank and IMF-induced
conditionalities. Seen in this light, GATS-driven
liberalisation is merely a continuation of
liberalisation experiences that developing countries
have already encountered, over which they often
have not been able to exercise much control.
“Privatisation” refers to ‘the transfer of majority
ownership of state-owned companies (SOEs) to the
private sector by the sale of ongoing concerns or of
assets following liquidation’ (Kikeri et al.1994: 242).
In the water sector, this transfer of ownership takes
place in a variety of different ways.As Table 1 shows,
there are different ways to organise private
involvement in the water sector andeachhas different
characteristics. In the case of a service contract, only
the operations andmaintenance of water supply are
transferred to the private sector, and for periods of
typically limited duration. At the other extreme,
concession contracts and divestiture transfer most
of the activities involving water supply to private
companies for long or indefinite periods of time.
Past experience of the last two decades suggests
that concession contracts are the most widely
adopted privatisation arrangement in the water
sector (Nickson 2001). While open competition
among competitors in the market is not possible,
because of the water sector’s status as a natural
monopoly, the use of such contracts allow states to
create competition for the market (contestability).
Thus private utilities are seen to allow market-based
mechanisms to discipline the companies and assure
higher efficiency levels and investments.Of course,
such a situation also creates a parallel opportunity
for rent-seeking behaviour on the part of both local
politicians and companies (cf. Petrella 2001 and
Cecila Ugaz, personal communication, 2002).
Very little research has systematically been
conducted on the consequences of privatisation for
poor people’s access to water and their ability to
pay for it.However, the evidence, which is available
and publicly accessible, indicates that we have no
real reason to be sanguine. Bayliss (2001) reviews
the outcome of water privatisation schemes in three
African countries: Guinea, Senegal andCôte d’Ivoire.
While the nature of the contractual arrangements
that govern the involvement of private actors in the
three countries’ water sectors vary from medium-
term lease contracts to long-term concession
contracts, the outcome of the privatisation process
is similar across all three cases. Connection rates
have increased, sometimes significantly, and clear
improvements are documented in core aspects of
revenue rising, as a consequence of better tariffs,
billing and collection rates. High prices have,
however,made public water supplies unaffordable
for many of the poorest segments of society, which
because of inability to pay have been hit by
widespread disconnections.Moreover, it is highly
unlikely that the poorest of the poor have benefited
from the expansion of network connections, which
has taken place in all three countries as a
consequence of privatisation. As Rivera (1996)
argues, experience shows that the poorest sections
of a concession area tend to remain outside the
extension perimeter of the privatised services,
because they generally are perceived to be a high-
risk low return area among private operators of
water services.As such, it remains unclear whether
and how available privatisation models can be
applied in rural areas where people make and
sustain livelihoods in a diverse and holisticmanner
and where reliance on the state, donor agencies and
NGOs is also greater (Mehta 2003).
Price increases that place formal water supplies
outside the reach of poor people appear to be a
frequent outcome of water privatisation. For
example, inManila, ‘InternationalWater’ – aUK/US
consortium – doubled its prices within two years,
despite the fact that the initial contract included
specified price levels. Likewise, in the highly
controversial and now well-known plan to privatise
water services in Cochabamba in Bolivia, prices
would have increased 35 per cent. So, while it is
true, as Nickson (2001) argues that “efficiency” in
terms of reduced leakages and improved billing
and collection is enhanced in many cases by the
involvement of private sector actors in water
distribution services, water privatisation is rarely
more “efficient” and cost effective in terms of impact
on welfare when one considers questions related
to access and affordability of water services. The
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changes introduced by the private sector are more
likely to be in the interest of profit rather than social
development, since there is an inherent conflict
between capital markets (which are looking for
quick returns) and the need for long-term
investment to improve water services in developing
countries.As Donnelly argues,markets can lead to
compromising social and economic rights since
markets ‘can systematically deprive some individuals
in order to achieve the collective benefits of
efficiency’ (Donnelly 1999: 628).
Thus, it is essential that all countries have strong
regulatory bodies in place prior to privatisation that
can subject commercial providers to tariff
regulations, quality standards, and sensitivity to
welfare concerns which are renegotiable in order
to allow for adjustment to changing economic
circumstances (Ugaz 2001a; Rees 1998). Still, in
practice, apparently neat public administration
accountability checks in the formof regulators rarely
function in a satisfactory manner. For example, in
Buenos Aires, an independent regulatory agency
was established to monitor the quality of service,
represent consumers and ensure the fair
implementation of the contract.However, research
demonstrates that at times powerful interests
captured it and at times it was too weak to resist
them (Loftus and McDonald 2001: 16).
Consequently it was ineffective and was not
consulted when the contract was rewritten. Thus,
regulatory frameworks and institutions may not
always work in the interests of the poor. This
discussion provides the basis to understand what
GATS-led liberalisation would build on.
4 The controversies around the
GATS
The GATS is the first and only set of multilateral
rules covering international trade in services. The
agreement covers all services, except those provided
in the exercise of governmental authority and those
related to air traffic rights (WTO 2002b).3 More
specifically, the agreement covers four different
“modes of supply”, which define trade in services
under the GATS such as cross-border supply,
consumption abroad, commercial presence and
presence of natural persons.
The key principle of the GATS, which applies
to trade in all service modes, is non-discrimination
(WTO 2002b). This implies that all member-states
are required to extendmost-favoured nation treatment
to all other members, i.e. to treat all trading partners
equally. This is less onerous than the principle of
national treatment. This principle, which requires
a country to give the same treatment to others as it
does to its own nationals, only applies to those
service sectors andmodes of supply that are listed
in the country’s schedule of commitments (WTO
2002b). As the name implies, ‘schedules of
commitments’ list the commitments to open
markets in specific sectors made by individual
countries.A country can define its schedule so that
it can limit not only the degree of national treatment
it is willing to accord to foreign competitors but
also the level ofmarket access that it is prepared to
grant in certain sectors (WTO 2002b). Limiting the
degree of national treatment in a certain sector may
imply that foreign-service providers are allowed to
operate only one branch within the country, while
domestic companies face no such restrictions.
The stated aim of the GATS (article 19) is to
progressively liberalise trade in services, i.e. open
up service sectors that are currently closed to trade
and promote the elimination of restrictions
consideredbarriers to trade in sectors that are already
open.However, as critics such as Das (2001), writing
for Third World Network, argue the focus on
‘progressive liberalisation of services’ services largely
benefits countries, which are endowed with relatively
more developed level of services. Indeed, as a group
of developing countries argued in 2002,developing
countries share of world service exports has increased
only by 6 per cent since the adoption of the GATS
to 1999. By contrast, OECD (Organization for
EconomicCooperation andDevelopment) countries
account for three-quarters of world’s exports of
services and most of these are concentrated in the
hands ofmultinationals.These trends would appear
to contradict Article IV of theGATS, which seeks to
enhance developing country participation in world
trade in services (WTO 2002a).
Critics have also argued that the exemption from
the GATS of services provided in the exercise of
governmental authority, defined as those services
that are supplied: ‘neither on a commercial basis,
nor in competition with one or more service
suppliers’ (WTO 2002b: 1), does not necessarily
mean that water services and other public services
are outside the reach of the GATS. It is unclear
whether this exception will apply to public services
since the increasing presence of private sector actors
in all such sectors in most countries arguably
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constitutes competition to the public sector. As
Table 1 shows, there is often a continuum between
what constitutes the public and private in service
delivery and the separation of what is public and
private is rarely clear cut. Similarly, even
governments now charge user fees for public
services in health and water. It is therefore not clear
under what conditions competition would be seen
to exist and under what conditions services would
qualify under the GATS clause for governmental
services.This ambiguity in the agreement can clearly,
thus, bemanipulated to suit powerful interests and
broadly depends on the lens of interpretation.
Krajewski (2001), who has discussed the scope of
the GATS, concludes that the application of
international principles of treaty interpretation to
Article 1:3 (b) and (c), which defines the scope of
the GATS, is likely to result in a narrow
interpretation of what constitutes services provided
in the exercise of governmental authority. This
consequently means a broad scope of GATS.
Liberalisation under the GATS follows a
“requests/offers” process.Countries make requests
to other countries to have market access to certain
sectors. Subsequently,members respond with offers
and commitments. In principle, countries can list
conditions and limitation in their schedules
regarding the participation of foreign companies
in certain sectors and principles to favour domestic
firms. Still, as the organisations behind the
GATSAttack (GATSwatch 2001) claim, GATS rules
may restrict the ability and willingness of
governments to commit public funds to public
works,municipal services and social programmes
because national treatment rules would require
such funds to bemade available to all actors, public
or private, domestic or foreign. It is also argued that
the principle of national treatment can limit
governments’ ability to enact policies that favour
the growth of local companies or favour local
suppliers and local managers, hire or train local
staff (World Development Movement 2002: 21).
According to the supporters of the WTO, the
criticisms ofGATS are based onmisunderstandings
and scare stories whichnegate the fact that theGATS
explicitly recognises ‘the right of members to
regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the
supply of services within their territories in order
to meet national policy objectives’ (WTO 2002b:
11).We now turn to whether governments would
indeed have this right to regulate.
5 Restrictions on governments’
regulatory freedom?
A key issue regarding poor people’s access to
water resources under privatised management
arrangements concerns whether efforts to
achieve universal access will be compromised,
especially in rural areas and impoverished urban
neighbourhoods. In principle, GATS would
allow governments the freedom to develop poli-
cies that would support universal access. In fact,
there are no restrictions on ‘the number or types
of conditions which may be attached to national
treatment commitments. A requirement that for-
eign banks wishing to establish in the country
should set up branches in every village, for
example, would also be perfectly legitimate’
(WTO 2002b: 1).
However, ambiguities of interpretation and
uncertainty in the agreement still remain. Take,
for example, issues around technical standards
and domestic regulation. Technical standards
associated with formal network provision may
need to be redesigned to facilitate network expan-
sions to poor areas. The extent to which such a
redefinition of technical standards would be pos-
sible under the GATS is not clear. Article VI.4 of
the agreement requires current negotiations to
develop regulatory disciplines, which can ensure
that domestic ‘qualification requirements and
procedures, technical standards and licensing
requirements do not constitute unnecessary bar-
riers to trade in services’ (WTO 1994: 290).
Clearly, the outcome of these negotiations will
depend on the exact definition of “technical stan-
dards” and “barriers to trade”. There is still a lack
of clarity on issues such as domestic laws, guide-
lines, subsidies, licensing standards and econom-
ic means tests. The GATS could also apply to all
levels of governments (including federal and
provincial). In India, for example, the state gov-
ernments have relative autonomy in several sec-
tors, including water, education, health and a
broad application of the GATS could undermine
the autonomy of provincial and local govern-
ment. There is still no clarity on all these issues
and the “Working Group on Domestic
Regulation” has been charged with the develop-
ment of these disciplines and their decisions will
determine impacts on governments’ freedom to
act in a pro-poor fashion (see Mehta and la Cour
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Madsen 2003, for more details on technical stan-
dards and the equally controversial “necessity
means test”).4
Furthermore, following the discussion in Section
3, achieving universal provision of water services
often requires explicit state involvement with respect
to safety-net regulation.To fulfill this need for safety
nets that guarantee access to water services for those
who are unable to meet the costs associated with
this,may imply that operators have to provide water
free of charge to certain consumers (Finger and
Allouche 2002). Private companies are, however,
unlikely to perform this function without any
reimbursement of costs and it is therefore essential
that governments maintain the right to subsidise
either suppliers or end consumers, when this is
required to achieve legitimate social objectives. But
theGATS currently contains no specific disciplines
intended to govern the use of demand or supply-
side subsidies and subsidisation is therefore only
subject to the principle of non-discrimination in
those cases where national treatment commitments
have beenmade (McCulloch et al. 2001).We believe
that it is essential that any futureGATS disciplines
developed in this area allow for the use of subsidies
in cases where market failures make this the best
instrument to legitimate social objectives. Still,
following interviews with negotiators frommiddle-
income and poor countries in Geneva is appears
that the USA and the EU are not keen to flesh out
and nuance the unfinished discussions of the
Uruguay Round around the “rules dimension”
concerning subsidies and safeguards that would
protect the interests of the poor.
In sum, in an ideal world, the GATS does not
appear to limit domestic governments’ regulatory
freedom of manoeuvre. However, the real world
most typically falls short of being ideal and the
possibility exists that the ambiguities around the
interpretation of the agreement itself could be
manipulated to serve the interests of powerful
nations and corporations. Similarly, current GATS
negotiations, especially on domestic regulation and
subsidies, could result in inexpedient restrictions
on governments’ freedom to formulate and
implement the regulation deemed necessary to
safeguard the interests of the poor when private
actors take part in the provision of water services.
6 The politics of process
Several aspects of the GATS negotiations have the
potential to work against the realisation of the ideal
scenario sketched out above.We call these realities
of the politics of process.These refer to the unequal
nature of members to participate equally inWTO
processes and negotiations and the ways in which
institutional arrangements at the WTO are
embedded in wider issues of political economy and
power.We focus on two key issues.
6.1 Who has the capacity to
regulate/negotiate?
At the time of offering commitments, a government’s
ability to maintain a fair degree of regulatory
freedom to oversee the liberalisation of its services
under GATS depends on its ability to specify in the
form of “limitations”, any regulation that it would
seek to maintain or develop. The specification of
such “limitations” does, however, require an
enormous degree of administrative capacity and
foresight by GATS signatories at the point ofmaking
a commitment. Often this is lacking to many
developing country negotiators. Consider this
statement made by an ambassador from a poor
country in an interview in June 2003:
Do we have the freedom to regulate? In principle
yes. In reality no. The weaker country is usually
at a massive disadvantage. In order to make a
request or respond to one you need to give details
of what exactly everything entails – you need to
be familiar with national laws, rules and specific
regulations, and that too for every country.We
don’t have this level of detail of other countries.
By contrast, the more powerful countries have
all these details about us … this is reflected in
their requests. I am astonished by the level of
detail that they specify in their requests!
The ambassador was referring to the recent EU
requests which were targeted at 109 countries,
including all the countries classified as Least
Developed Countries (LDC) in the WTO (World
Development Movement 2003: 9). By contrast, the
EU received requests from only one LDC (World
Development Movement 2003: 12).
While it is true that theWTO secretariat has been
offering promises of “technical assistance” and
“capacity building” to developing countries, the
actual assistance delivered is often very little more
than the odd seminar presented by international
WTO technocrats who are largely legal and economic
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specialists based in Geneva. Often they are not
equipped todeal with intangible issues around social
equity and participation, bearing in mind the local
needs and concerns of local businesses, academics
and civil society members.Rather than empowering
developing countries to define, negotiate and
consolidate their own positions vis-à-vis theWTO,
there is a rather top-down approach towards
assistance and capacity building which seeks topush
countries to adapt to and take on board existing
obligations and commitments, often framed by the
Quad group (i.e. The EuropeanUnion, theUnited
States, Canada and Japan). Little wonder, then, that
many developing country negotiators view activities
around “capacity building” and “technical assistance”
as a tool to pressurise developing countries to agree
to negotiations on new issues (see also Jawara and
Kwa 2003).
The request-offer mode often ends up being a
bilateral negotiation between two countries, despite
the multilateral context of the WTO. Clearly, the
rich and powerful countries can exert tremendous
pressure on a poorer country to respond quickly
or positively to a request. Clearly there are many
merits to multilateralism and the advantages that
negotiating inGeneva offers.According to one LDC
ambassador, ‘Here in Geneva the different
developing countries can support each other and
resist pressure. For example, the LDCs can get
together and exert pressure or India, Brazil and
South Africa can make noise. Back home in the
capitals it’s a different story. The process of arm-
twisting is much more overt’ (interview with
ambassador, Geneva, 19 June 2003). This is in
keeping with research by Sheila Page who argues
that despite uneven power relations in the
negotiation process, developing countries have
gradually improved their negotiating capacity from
the experience gained through successive trade
rounds and is developing sophisticated positions
on a range of issues (Page 2003). However, the
bilateral nature of the request-offer mode, coupled
withpressure fromother bilateral investment treaties
arising from the Bank and IMF, can seriously
undermine the slight advantages arising out of
multilateral settings.
6.2 No turning back?
The potential negative consequences of
governments’ lack of capacity and foresight at the
time of making GATS commitments seems to be
reinforced by the rigidity ofArticleXXI of theGATS,
which sets out the procedure that a country must
follow in case it wants to modify its GATS
commitments. The article specifies that (1)
modifications cannot be initiated until three years
after the initial commitment entered into force; (2)
that other members must be given three months
notice of what the nature of the modification is;
and (3) that the modifying country must come up
with compensating commitments, which
compensate for the modification and satisfy all
WTO members. As such, GATS commitments
clearly take on a certain degree of irreversibility, if
not in theory, then in practice and this could
potentially have a negative effect on people’s access
to basic social services, among these water. This is
particularly so if developing countries are pressured
intomaking irreversible commitments before they
fully understand the consequences.
Another issue related to the difficulties in
reversingGATS commitments is rooted in the stated
aim of the agreement, namely to ‘progressively
liberalise trade in services’. Since “progressive
liberalisation” is to be achieved either through the
commitment ofmore sectors or through the gradual
elimination of existing barriers to trade in scheduled
sectors, governments that have managed to make
limitations to GATS provisions in their original
schedules may be asked to give up such limitations
by other GATS signatories in future negotiations.5
The fact that developing country negotiators are
wary of the virtual irreversible nature ofGATSmay
explain why they are making commitments to far
fewer sectors than what has already taken place
under processes of autonomous liberalisation in
their countries.A negotiator from amiddle-income
country explains, ‘We could get locked into aprocess
which could just go badly wrong’ (interview, 18
June 2003).
7 Conclusion
This article has argued that while the international
liberalisation of basic social services under theGATS
at the de jure level could be managed in ways that
will be able to safeguard the interests of the poor,
ambiguities in interpretation, power games, politics
and reasons of a wider political economy suggest
that GATS could de facto undermine poor people’s
rights to water. Taking into consideration the high
level of natural monopoly, which characterises the
water sector, and water’s importance for human
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well-being, it is essential that domestic governments
maintain the ability to regulate the water sector, if
and when international liberalisation of water
services becomes a reality. However, experiences
fromnon-WTO-related water privatisation coupled
with the lack of clarity around subsidies and
domestic regulation aroundGATS leave us no real
reason to be sanguine.And as we have demonstrated
elsewhere (seeMehta and la Cour Madsen 2003),
the present regime of the WTO/GATS also seems
more comfortable with endorsing the rights of
corporations than those of more marginalised
constituencies. This coupled with the politics of
WTOnegotiations andprocesses often disadvantage
weaker and poorer countries.
The collapse of talks at Cancun and the exit
option pursued by developing countries theremay
signal the opportunity for actors in both theNorth
and South to step back and reflect critically on what
the various future negotiations (including theGATS)
couldmean for poor people’s rights and well-being.
In order for the GATS to be more consistent with
social, equity and welfare concerns, there is an
urgent need for adequate social, technical and
economic assessments and more official attempts
to mainstream human rights considerations.
Systematic lessons need to be learnt fromnon-GATS
privatisation experiences and options such as
management contracts, which offer governments
a greater say, should seriously be explored. There
is also an urgent need for fairer and accountable
systems around developing negotiating capacity
that do not just promote the interests of the rich
countries. Furthermore, the bilateral structure
around the request/offer mode could shift tomore
genuine multilateral-style negotiations where
developing countries are less disadvantaged. It is
also necessary to abolish or amend the irreversibility
provision, allowing for a flexible process whereby
a country’s commitments can be withdrawn if the
economic,political and social changes that a country
encounters demands this.Until thesemeasures are
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squarely in place, it is best that the social sectors
such as water remain out of the reach of GATS-
directed liberalisation.
Notes
* Research for this article took place within the scope of
the DFID-funded research project ‘Linking the WTO
to the Poverty-Reduction Agenda’. We are grateful to
all our interview partners in Geneva and the UK for
their time and for sharing their knowledge with us. For
obvious reasons, we have kept their views anonymous.
We thank Rob Jenkins and John Humphrey for mak-
ing this research possible and are grateful to them for
their patience and very useful comments. The analysis
presented here is developed further in Mehta and la
Cour Madsen 2003. Responsibility for all errors that
may remain rests solely with the authors.
1. For example, at the 2001 Bonn Freshwater Conference
many stakeholders – including representatives of gov-
ernments and business – made verbal endorsements of
the human right to water, but the final conference doc-
ument failed to acknowledge it explicitly.
2. Available at theWorldMeteorological Organisation web-
site, www.wmo.ch/index-en.html (accessed November
2003).
3. Services provided in the exercise in governmental
authority are defined as ‘those supplied neither on a
commercial basis nor in competition with other sup-
pliers’ (WTO 2002b: 1). The extent to which this
implies that essential social services are not potentially
subject to the GATS is widely debated. For a detailed
discussion of this see Krajewski (2001).
4. Some of these criticisms of the potential negative
impacts of the GATS are also endorsed by the High
Commissioner for Human rights (HCHR) in several
reports, which are the first step to determine the
human rights impacts of trade; see United Nations
Economic and Social Council (2002b).
5. For a relevant example of this around the Thai retail sec-
tor see World Development Movement 2003: 13–14.
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